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SUM!URY 
Chapter I - INTRODUCTIQf - as this is the last report the Rapporteur 
vi11 submit to the Political Committee, he has concentrated on those 
issues he believes to be ot most direct relevance to the future form and 
role ot the Alliance. 'l'wo issues suggest themselves - firstly current 
perceptions concerning the growth of Soviet power and the spread of Soviet 
intluenc~. and seconclly, the groving political relevance of' CoDIIIlUDist parties 
in Southern Europe; the Rapporteur believes that Alliance response to these 
issues has been tashionad too much by out-moded concepts and exaggerated 
tears and preoccupation~ and a more realistic an~ objective approach is nov· 
necessary; he also stresses that our preoccupation with the E~t-West 
relationship should not blind us or dominate our views concerning problems 
and issues in the developing world; the report provides a brief SUIIIIIl&I'Y' 
ot the present situation in Spain and coverage of' a rather more general 
but significant problem, nuclear proliferation. 
Chapter II - SOVIET P0\>1ER AND INFLUENCE - remarks that· public opinion has 
been led to accept a view of Soviet power and behaviour that is both 
exaggerated and over simplified; to a large eJ¢ent this has been the 
result of clomestic developments, particularly the Preeidential elections 
in the United States. Cer1iainly there have been consistent improve1118nts 
to Soviet forces and competition between East and West wil-l contin~. but 
the West can cope with bothtactors when seen in their proper context. The 
tendency to over-react to Soviet power has had JI1&DY unfortunate 
consequences, frequently regarding events in other parts of the world. 'l'he 
Rapporteur asks tor a more balanced approach to cle~lopments based on 
objective analysis rather than pathological suspicions and emotional rhetoric. 
The Milit~ Balance - comments on the correlation between current assessmentq 
oi'-iiie'baliz1ce-o'l-polfer and public opinion regarding East-West relations. .· 
The Rapporteur examines the wqs in which statistics are misused and mis-
represented to create a distorted picture of the military balance. He 
quotes examples from st1,1dies recently produced by Congressman Leslie 
Aspin, and comments that details emerging trom the examination of the MiG 25 
Foxbat in Japan appear to confound previous Department of De.tence assessments 
ot the aircraft - a good example of exaggerating the threat? 
Soviet Influence - examines events in Southern Africa, particularly Angola 
and-notes-that-this has been widely interpreted as an unambiguous 
indication of Soviet expansionism. The Rapporteur discusses some ot the 
factors which are frequently ignored and which in his view significantly 
quality such an assumption:; although the question of Rhodesia is now the 
dominant issue, the lesson of Angola must not be lost - any settlement must 
be based on national aspirations and realities, not on super power notions 
of' stability and self-interest; Western credibility in African eyes is 
already low and will decline even further it our sole criteria tor obtaining 
a settlement is the strategic im!x>rtance of South Africa. 
./ ... 
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Summary - asserts that over-reaction is ulti....t.ely detrimental to the 
AiiiBiice; we should not ignore Soviet actions but nei~her exaggerate 
ii 
the realities ot Soviet power nor ignore the limitations on their abili't¥ 
to gain influence; exaggerated notions ot our own vul.nerabilit;y c1o ~ 
enhance the securit;y ot the Alliance. 
Chapter III - WEST FORO'PEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES - notes that the questiOil ~ 
communist participation in governments in Western Europe is a problem 
tor the f'uture structure ot the Alliance and is a source of a majQr dif'teren~ 
between the United States and Europe; the emergence of European Colm:amist 
Party's will mark a turther move a~ trom the static and rigi~ 
defined zones ot the Cold War and necessitate a further reshapi.Dg of attitudes 
and views towards the Alliance. 
The Italian Communist Party - the position of the Italian Communist Part:v 
rs-Siizii'liciiit'ii-rt-tiaseome close to assuming responsibility in the 
governing ot the country; the Report notes the PCI' s stress on its 
independence and autonomy, and its professed wish tor Ital.y' to remain 
in NATO as a "useful shield" against Soviet interference. 
~-~~-~-~ .• ~~!!!!~~ - comments on the su~cess ot. the indepe~nt 
part1es 1n oppos1ng the etf'orts of the conservat1 ve part1es to establish 
a 11general line!1 • 
Alliance Objections - comments on the practical objections Alliance 
otfici8ii-8dvmceregarding the consequences of Communist participation 
in an Alliance country; the Rapporteur does not agree with these objections. 
Moreover he believes that threats and warnings are counter-productive and 
that the Alliance must adopt a more flexible and prasmatic approach to 
the emergence ot Euro-communism. 
Chapter IV - SPAIR .::. although several recent developments indicate that 
Spain is moving towards a more democratic and liberal society. the present 
situation contains inherent contraai.ctions which must qual.if)' ~ optimistic 
forecast tor Spain's future; the institutional and administrative framework 
erected by Franco remains as a formidable obstacle to the liberalising 
reforms required by the popular forces; the Report notes the three groups . 
that have emerged in this transitional period, the Bunket: .. ·, the Ki:ng and 
his government , and the popular forces. It comments on the various changes 
including the general amnest;y, measures attecting the 11:f'reedoms '', and 
the government's dratt law tor political retorm.. but remarks that all meuaes 
aimed at relaxation and reform have been hampered by the rigid tramework 
within which they have to work. The govermnent must soon chOOse between 
d1smautling 1;he old structure so that all treedoms can be lega.lly and 
permanentlY !stablished and popular participation ensured, and continuing 
with its policy ot halt measures and the inevitable alienation of the popular 
forces. 
Chapter V - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION .. comments on the very real c1angers of 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the spreading of nuclear 
technology; it is critical in this respect of the attitudes of some member 
countries, adherence to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty should be a prior 
condition to obtaining nuclear ttcbaology and stricter measures regarding 
safeguards should be adopted. 
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I. 
1. As this is the last report that the Rapporteur will submit to 
the Political Committee be baa decided to restrict his coverage to those 
issues he believes to be ot the most direct relevauce to the future 
tom aud role ot the Alliauce. Undoubtedl1' the Alliauce is passing 
tbrough a ditticult aDd uncertaiD phase involving nev pressures aud 
tenaiCDS which demand a 1110re .flexible response thau has been afforded 
in the past. Security is no l.cDger a queatiOD ot m111t&l'7 power alODe. 
It is increasingly influenced by a range ot ~tical 8Dd econcmic 
factors which are tending to blur the prev1oual1' veU-detined linea ot 
All18Dce security policy. 
2. In the Rapporteur's view two issues suggest themselves as 
being not onl1' ot immediate interest 1 but also ot ve7:7 crucial significance 
to the tuture direction ot the All1ance. P1ratl1' 1 the current perceptions 
ot the relationship between the Soviet UniCD and the West 1 particular~ 
as reflected in common assumptions concerning the growth ot Soviet power 
and the spread ot Soviet influence .1 and aecondl1', the growing poll tical 
relevance ot Communist parties in Southern lurope. 
3. Both issues have recentl1' been the subject ot intense public 
interest and debate, and both are ot direct and immediate relevance to 
the principles o.nd objectives on which the Alliance vas fOUDded. In the 
Rapporteur's view, the Alliance response to these issues has been 
taahiCDed too otten by out-moded concepts and exaggerated tears 8Dd pre-
occupations. Ita fUture shape and relevance 1 however, will depend to a 
large extent CD ita ability to cope vi th these and other problems on a 
more realistic and objective basis. 
4. One aspect in particular should be stressed concerning the 
evolution ot the Alliance and ita ability to adjust. to au4 acuwrmoda.te nev 
pressures. AltbOUSb the East-West relationship will remain the dominant 
theme in international relations , this dcminance will be threatened by 
the increasing power and influence ot developing nations, 8Dd the·.; 
sisniticance ot eccm.cmic and poll tical factors ot an extra-regional 
nature. This process is relevant here in one important respect. We lllUSt 
not allow our involvement with the East-West relationship to blind us or 
to dominate our Views concerning developments and problems in the 
developing world. We should not presume that eve7:7 problem area can be 
made to respond to the demands ot our own security requirements. 
5. There is absolutely no necessity tor the Alliance to broaden 
its geosraphic boundar1es. But it shoulcl adopt a more objeatiYe aDd ,: 
responsive understanding to developnents which although outside these 
boundaries are felt to be ot direct relevance' and tor which ve bear 
either collectivel1' or ind1v1du~ sane measure ot responsibility. 
A 1110re flexible aud responsive approach would allow the All18Dce to plq 
a 1110re constructive role, albeit indirect~, in internaticoal attairs • 
. / ... 
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6. The Rapporteur has also includecl a brief sumtma.r;y ot the latest 
situation in Spain. Although he does not believe that events in Spain 
are crucial to the Alliance in the same sense as the other tvo issues , 
nevertheless, developments there are ot very real interest to all maber 
countries. . Furthermore 1 the reactiCDS Of Alliance countries t both 
ind1vt.4ual.ly and collective~, will cert~ have sane impact on the 
degree and pace ot the move to a more democratic system in Spain. 
7. A brief an~sis ot the problems of nuclear proliferation 
has also been presented because, although this is a more general 
problem, the Rapporteur believes that it is a subject of groriag 
seriousness and relevance, particular~ tor parliamentarians. It is 
a subject which poses crucial problems of a political, m1lit8.1"1 and 
economic nature and has tar reaching implications tor the security of 
all nations. · 
8. Fin~, ezq examination of the issues the Rapporteur has 
selected must inevitab~ place them in the broader perspective ot 
East-West relations and consider particularlY their relevance to the 
process of "detente". However, as 11detente·• has been the subject of 
a special working group (see Report T 170 PC/D (76) 12) the Rapporteur 
will, as tar as possible, 11m1t his remarks on the broader aspects of 
the process, and ccmcentrate on the tvo issues he considers ot most 
importance. 
II. SOVIET POWER AID IBFLUENCE 
9. The last year has witnessed a rising crescendo of criticism 
and alazm against several aspects of current relatiCIOB between East and 
West, and most spec1t1call1 vhat has been perceived as the substantial 
growth in Soviet power and influence. Public interest has focused on 
tvo areas, tirstl1 reports of the continuing build-up in all aspects of 
Soviet arms , and secondl1 Soviet support in assisting the MPLA to gain 
power in Angola, which mezq observers cl.a.1$ represented a quantum Jump 
in the attainment ot Soviet objectives and in their eyes is therefore 
classified as a maJor defeat tor the West. 
10. The Rapporteur will examine both ot these areas in turn because 
in his view public opinion concerning detente has been led to accept a 
view ot Soviet behaviour which is both exaggerated and over-simplified. 
The ~mplexities ot the international situation have been ignored through 
the adoption ot simple slogans aimed pr1maril1 at generating domestic 
support tor political plattorms,rather than contributing to a genuine 
understandias ot developments in; the international field. Detente has 
become associated with such phrases as "beias sott on the Russians", 
11being second best", and confirming "the enslavement of Eastern Europe11 • 
. / ... 
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U. There are, in the Rapporteur's view JI1BD1' reasons tor this. 
Firstly, public reaction to detente has been shaped more by the require-
ments ot clanestic politics than by the realities ot internaticaal attairs. 
'!'his is particularly true in the United States where the introduction ot 
detente as an issue ot considerable importance in the Presidential 
elections has made objective vieviDB to sq the least ditticult. Parther-
more detente has become so closely identified with the present Secret&r1 
ot State, Dr. Kissinger, that opponents ot both the style and content 
ot his c11plOJll&C7 have been able to use it as. an e&S7 8Dc1 convenient weapon 
with which to attack his position. 
12. 'l'hese internal developllents have all contributed to a sroviDs 
teel.iDg ot public scepticism 8Dc1 disenchantment with detente. 'l'his 
mood has been reinforced bf the ever present arguments ot milit&r1 
officials and armaments manufacturers whose .interests quite naturally 
direct them to presenting the Soviet Union as a threateniag and formidable 
enemy. 
13. In makiag these caaments the Rapporteur is in no vq suggestins 
that the Soviet Union is a .power whose motives are based on altruism or 
the ultimate well-being ot the Western system. Be is tully aware ot 
the consistent impi'O'Ielllents in both quantity and quality to the Soviet 
forces and ot ·their constant endeavours to SaiD influence. lte recalls, 
however, Mr. Sonnenteldt • s ca~~~ents to the Sub-Committee on • detente' 
that the emergence ot the Soviet Union as a super-power on a slobal scale 
vas a developnent that vas inevitable resardless ot the regime that 
existed in Russia. It had. not occurred tbrouab aDY Western poliey or 
failure ot Western polley, and it was a phenCDenon ·that the West would 
have to contend with tor the foreseeable future. Mcteover, Mr. Sonnenteldt 
had stressed that the substantial weaknesses ot the Soviet qstem and the 
diversity in the international cODIDlUDist movement meant that the West 
should be able to restrain this emersiag power. 
14. Areas of competition between East and West will inevitably 
continue, but in the RapporteUr's view, this is a c~test in which the 
West need have fev tears. It is the East that is moviag to closer 
economic relations with the West and yet, at the same time, attemptiDS 
to prevent the accaa.p&DYins Western influences. Despite their efforts 
it is an inevitable process and it is by this route that East-West 
relations will graclually evolve to a more stable and constructive level. 
This evolution, however, will not occur easily it we are distracted by 
those vho continue to err alarm and despondeney, and who for a variety 
ot reasons · prefer that East and West relations revert to a level ot 
hostility, suspicion and continual friction. 
15. 'l'he tendeney to over-react to Soviet strength and influence 
has bac1 serious consequences in several respects. It bas continued to 
fuel the endless arms spiral at all levelS of armaments. It has also 
influenced our perceptions of events in other regions of the world. Too 
otten we have allowed our preoccupation with 'the threat' to blind us 
./ ... 
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to the realities of local or-regional problema. In order to save or 
ensure the balance of power we have attempted to impose solutions that 
have ignored national aspirations. Frequently, we have been influenced 
by voices whose pathological reactions to the Soviet Union obscures their 
objectivity to developments outside. t)le East - West context. 
16. The Rapporteur would therefore suggest that, when seen in 
the tull context of international affairs and with a realistic and 
objective approach to East-West relations, · 
- developments in Soviet power and influence are not as sin.tater · 
and threateniag as frequently represented, particularly when each 
issue is examined in ita proper context; 
- &DY' view of detente that sees it as an end to aU forma of 
competition between the two systems is extremely ~opic; 
- it is impossible to relate ever.r development in the world to the 
East-West relationship; 
- an exaggerated response to these developments could provoke a 
return to the mood of the Cold War years, a heightening of tension 
and an inevitable escalation in arms 'development that could have 
fatal consequences. 
17. The Rapporteur is therefore asking for a more balanced approach 
to developments than has trequent]Jr been accorded, an approach based on 
objective ana]Jrsis rather than pathological suspicion and emotional 
rhetoric. This rhetoric is all too often designed either to attract 
domestic poll tical support, or to gain funds for costly defence program• 
mea, or to interest prospective buyers in weapons systems. One is thus 
forced to ask whether the frequent pronouncements of substantial increases 
in Bov~et power and influence are accurate reflections of the present· 
situation, or are they the exaggerated response of those whose reactions 
to the SOTiet Union are clictated by the positions '-' thq .. hol4 or 
the political platforms they seek to promote? 
18. Briefly, the Rapporteur would like to examine two aspects of 
Soviet behaviour that have been widely discussed: Soviet increases in 
the armaments field and Soviet actions in Southern Africa, and to suggest 
that the dramatic pronouncements on both issues should be scmevhat 
qualified. 
The Milita!7 Balance 
19. Although detailed analysis of the current balance in m1litar,r 
strength between East and West belongs in the Mili tar.r Comni ttee, the 
methodology of arriving at -.u.y of the current interpretations and the 
use to which these interpretations are put are diatinctlt relevant to 
the Political Comittee, because these assessments frequently influence 
./ ... 
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political judgements. It is important to realise the tu11 political 
significance of military assessments and the tact that too otten these 
assessments acquire a definitive authoritf'that ls· lett uachallenged 
and unsubstantiated. · :.· •. ''* .... 
20. Furthermore, a definite:correlation exists between current 
assessments ot the balance of power and public opinion regarding the 
condition of East-West relations. · Publicity concerning the rise in 
Soviet military capability can otten be explained by the annual 
examination ot the United States Defence Budget, and the presentation 
ot arguments by officials anxious to ·get t.he maximum allotment of funds 
possible. However, this is not the only explanation tor the continual 
emphasis on Soviet military strength. As part of the trend in which 
detente is seen as a negative process the expansion ot Soviet military 
power is consistently quoted as evidence ot Soviet "double talk". 
21. During the following brief survey the F.&pporteur will examine 
certain examples to show how the statistics which are frequently 
presented, can be misused and misrepresented to create the desired 
effect. He will also indicate certain areas where Western._!Uperiority 
in technology has been chlmonstrated. Several of his arguments will be 
based on recent studies produced by Gbngressman Leslie Aspin which 
analyse iri greater detail some of the bare statistics submitted in 
testimoDJ to Congressional Committees by Department of Defence officials. 
22. Defence Expenditure - Mr. Aspin quotes Department of Defence 
statements to the effect that the Soviet Union is outspending the United 
States b1 approximately 30%, but he explains that such estimates are based 
on a ndollar comparison", i.e. the United States intelligence agencies 
examine what the Sov.teta have in tanks, planes, manpower etc. and then 
calculate what it would cost to build that equip11ent and pq those men 
in the United States. When one remembers that the Soviets dratt men 
and pq them veey little, whereas the United States pqs high wages, 
this sort of comparison is clearly unrealistic. As the Military Balance 
points out comparing Soviet and United states defence spending is a ve17 
camplex process because of the different inputs, different pricing 
practises and above all, the difticult1 in finding an accurate and 
meaningful exchange rate. For a fuller discussion of this issue see 
the Military Balance 1975-76 published by the IISS. 
23. Strategic Arms: considerable publicity has been given to the 
growth in Soviet missile capability, yet, as Dr. Kissinger has said, 
the United States is still way ahead in warheads (8,500 to 2,500) and 
precision guidance technology and these remain the critical factors in 
the strategic equation. 
24. Furthermore, the United states is currently moving ahead on a 
new ICBM which arms control experts maintain will add a new dimension to 
the nuclear force by providing not onl.1' a retaliatory capacity, but also 
./ ... 
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a clear war-fighting capability to attack Soviet missiles;and military 
installations. The new missile will have more warheads, several times 
the PQ"load and be twice U...-<JIOCurate as the present Missileman 8. It 
will also be mobile_~. a developinent· which· adcls further complications to 
future arms control agreements, because ot the obvious complications 
tor monitoring procedures. 
25. A further symptom. ot. the tendency to exaggerate and clistort 
Soviet policies vas seen in the recent debate over Soviet civil defence 
measures. This vas sparked by the publication ot a book* which alleged that 
these ll8&8U!'8S were endangering the· United States nuclear retaliatOJ'1 
capacity. However, claims regarcling the extent and effectiveness of 
Soviet civil defence measures were found to be either exaggerated or 
unsupported, indeed it vas adm1 tted that much ot the extr$polation vas 
pure guesswork. While it is true that the Soviet Union does put a high 
priority on defensive measures and has undertaken measures to protect 
war related industries, there is no evidence that they have a videspnad 
civilian evacuation capability that would, in ezq way, attect the 
United States deterrent capability. It w~d appear that the experts 
had ignored the gap between the rhetoric ot Soviet civilian capability 
as represented in their literature and in their actual capabilities. 
It vas , perhaps. not entirely coincidental that Soviet civil defence 
preparations appeared as one of the driving factors in the DOD's bid 
to deplqy new large-yield and more accurate strategic veaponr,y. 
26. Conventional Forces - trequent pronouncements by ~etence 
officials concerning the substantial increases in Soviet conventional 
power has greatly heightened public interest in this issue. Indeed 
there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union has aaada1derable 
quantative advantage over the West in several important areas. Never-
theless • the Rapporteur believes that J118D7 an~ses and canparisons 
frequently om1 t certain important qualifying factors and thus present 
a somewhat clistorted picture. 'l'he following short revie-" contains 
examples ot this tendency: · 
i) United states comparisons frequently omit the European contribution, 
tor example, on the question ot expenditure and manpower totals', 
according to the Mili tar,y Balance it all BATO is counted the 
situation is: BATO total expenditure $1'-9.87 (billion) and total 
manpower 'PT1.3 (thousand); Warsaw Pact total expencliture 
$111.37 (billion) and total manpower '-,639.0 (thous~d). It should 
also be.. noted that contrary to popular opinion the defence 
expencliture ot Europeans has shown a slight increase in real terms 
over the past ti ve years ; 
ii) the importance ot China in the strategic equation is otten 
ignored, 'a prudent Soviet an~st would add to the resources 
./ ... 
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iii) 
deployed qainat the Soviet Union the Chinese Defence Expend1 ture 
of perhaps $12.15 billion and Chinese Mili taey manpower of 
3,250.000 (the Stratesic ~); . 
.. ·-···· .. 
. [ .. '6 .. 
in ccmparins DATO - Soviet Union foi'ce levels 1 French forces are 
otten !Df,tted yet, it is· clitticult.to see a European conflict in 
which France would not 'be involved; 
iv) the very real advantaaes in quality possessed by the West, -
althOQSh aclalovlecJsed bj defence experts, are fl'equent}7 sulmersed 
by the emphasis on numbel'B; 
v) althoush Soviet...millta.t7 m&Dpover is. fc?.~l~ that of the United 
States ID8IV' of the S&ttet --eroops are· usisDed Jobs perfomed in 
the United States 'b7 civ1ll8Da or perfom Jobs that do not exist 
in the United States forces; 
vi) the clistortion that can be achieved through the selective use of 
statistics is most clear}7 shown in the maritime field. The 
Soviet Bavy has been til'lll17 established in popular opinion as 
represent ins a further area of Soviet superiority; its srowth is 
impressive - but in relation to its previous size. Distortion 
has occurred because estimates have stressed on:l7 the numerical 
levels , includiq even the smallest Soviet vessel and have anitted 
the size, role 8DCl force potential of these forces. Compared on a 
size or tonnase basis the United States Davy outweighs the Soviet 
lavy by 4 million tons to 1.5. Furthermore, a Department of 
Defence estimate that the Soviet Union was outbuildins the 
United States in canbat ships vas contradicted when a detailed 
breakdown revealed the inclusion of small Soviet vessels, and 
showed that clurins the past 15 years the United States has built 
122 surface ships of 3 1000 tons or more and the Soviet Union 57. 
When the whole llA'l'O Balance is examined BA'l'O has 355 major surf'ace 
canbat ships compared vith 236 Soviet vessels. Even in the area 
where the Soviet Union has superiorit7, conventional and nuclear 
attack submarines, the figures are not as assymetrical as sometimes 
auaested, 213 NATO and 263 Soviet Union. It should be noted that 
vith resard to submarines 8DCl maJor surface units the contribution 
ot the other Warsaw Pact states is insipiticut, 
vii)~ frequent]¥ it is not the present baluce that is attacked but the 
future trends 1 hence General Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
ot Staff "the thiDI that worries everyone, I think, concerniq 
the sea power balance is not the balance today as much as the 
trend ot srovins Soviet naval power". However, a brief study by 
Congres8Jil8D Aspin provides the following data: the adverse trends 
in United States naval power vere caused b7 bloc obsolescence, 
the problem is passed tor the United States Bavy, but lies in the 
future tor the Soviet Davy (the Soviet ship building boom was in 
./ ... 
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the 1950 • s) ; the United States nov outprocluces the Soviets in 
both surface varshipa and nuclear attack submarines (the Soviet 
submarine fleet will decline because ot the retirement ot diesels) ; 
the United States B&VJ" is growing 118a1D and, baaed solely on the 
ships ppproved tor construction 'b7 CoJlgl"ess as ot the end ot 1975 , 
it will continue to grow; 
viii) finally, perhaps the most reveallag view ot the state ot Soviet 
m111t&1'7 streDgth, and ot _t~e- accuracy ot sCDe ot our estimates 
ot their streJI81;h, will be :.e.f'to~ed 'b7 the results ot the analysis 
ot the Mig 25 Foxbat that landed :receutly in Japan. This was the 
aircraft frequently described in the Western press as: the moat 
advanced interceptor aircratt: :lrf'"tHe world.~··· Already there are 
auggestioDS that Western experts have- vastly overrated the Foxbat 1 s 
capabill ties. A recent article by Congressman Carr (a former 
pilot and member ot the House Armed Services carmi ttee) noted 
that the preoccupation ot the media with the aircratt 's &bill ty 
to tl7 high and at fast speeds had obscured the tact that in terms 
ot the requirements ot modern airpower the Foxbat is extremely 
llm1ted, and significantly interior to United States jets in every 
sense. Carr comented that max1mum speed and altitude are ot no 
significance to a fighter aircratt; the chief requirements are 
acceleration, manoeuvrability, small size ,cockpit visibility and 
good missiles. 'l'hus, be noted that the MiG 25 : 
- as a tighter is b~ equal to the 15 year old F-4 
Phantan and is hopelessly outclassed 'b7 the F-15 and F-16; 
- as a recODDaiasance- pl8Jle it is good but the United States bas 
had better tor a decade (the SB-71 Blackbird gets its longest 
range on top speed and altitude, the MiG 25 can cmly' sustain 
high speed and altitude tor 10 minutes.); 
- as an interceptor it is obsolete and 1nadequate, it bas no 
"look down" rac1&r to detect low flying bombers (United States 
strategic bomber missions now call tor penetration below 500 
teet.); 
- at low level penetration it is poor; it is incapable ot 
supersonic perto:rm.ance at low altitudes; · 
- "hishl¥ capable avionics 71 claimed tor it are· in tact simple 
vacuum Q"stems that the United States considered obsolete 10 
years ago; 
- despite predictions by United States Department ot Defence 
officials that titanium (a light very strong metal used in 
all United states aircraft) fabrication vas an area where 
the Soviet Union was 'unequivoc~' strong, the MiG 25 does 
not emplQJ' titanium but steel, with an inevitable degradation 
ot pertoi"IIIBDce. 
./ ... 
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As 0&rr remarks 1 these initial tindiDgS llU8t cast the gravest doubts 
on the crecU.billt;y of the Department of Defence's claims of Soviet 
military sophistication and expenditure. 
27. These are only a fev of JII&D1' instances where misuse or 
partial application of statistics and slanted interpretations have led 
to an UDDecesaari~ exaagerated presentation of the threat. Attention 
has recent~ been focussed very heavi~ on the milit&l7 balaDce with 
the general viev that the balance is ahiftiDg steadl~ and daDgerous~ 
in t•vour of the Soviet Union. This has been llDked with other 
'failures' of detente to create a general picture of pessimism and 
alarm. In the Rapporteur's viev much of the substance tor this picture 
is highly questionable. While he believes that we should, as an 
Alliance, be constantly aware of Eastern military capabilities, they 
should be seen with greater perspective and objectivit;y than is 
frequently afforded. Our strategy of deterrence is not eDhanced b7 
making the Russians more capable than they actually are. 
Soviet Influence 
28. Eve1;1ts in .Southern Africa and particul:arly ~la have given 
rise to the most bitter attacks and criticisms ot the current detente 
policy _,and have been widely seen as an unambiguous indication of Soviet 
expansionism. The Soviet Union is said to be ruthless~ purauiDg her 
objective ot apreacJ1Dg her power beyond her tracJitional areas of 
iDtluence and suppose~ turning force into political influence. 
29. The more extreme critics claim that the elimination ot South 
.Atrica is really the tiual objective of Soviet pollc;y, an achievement 
which will secure tor the 8,oviet Union a strategic position fran which 
she can begin the tiDal undermining ot Western Europe. Thus her poliey 
1D .Angola vas part of the Soviet Union' a messianic grand design tor 
world conquest, the prelude to a well orchestrated campaign which wUl 
eventual.ly end 1D the clom1nation ot the West. 
30. Such intwpretationa ignore JI1&D¥ factors tundamental to arq 
clear understandlns of the situation: 
- whatever the rishts or noaga of Soviet actions there can be 
11 ttle doubt that at the time of ADgolan iDClependence the Vest, 
and the United States particular]1', fouDCl itself without a 
coherent pollq towards this part of Africa; 
- even . worse, the West was CCIIDDO~ associated w1 th the colonial 
rule of Portugal while the Soviet Union was identified w1 th the 
popular forces of liberation; 
- the United States vas also seen as beiDS on the same aide as South 
Africa, whose direct iDVolvement brought the large numbers of 
Cuban ccmbat troops. Moat sources agree that it was the success of 
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the South African supported armoured column, Yhich. by the m1d4le 
ot Bovember had advanced close to IAlanda • that caused the musive 
increase in Soviet supplies and the substantial involvement of 
Cuban combat troops. In this respect the Rapporteul" read rith 
interest the recent article b7 IDrd Chalfont in the Times which 
stated that • confidential mili t817 an~sis nov circulatina in the 
govermnent here points out that South African troops ·not ~ 
reached IDbi to duriDS the qolan war 1 but inflicted ·heavy losses 
on the Cuban forces in exchange tor light casualities. The inferenc• 
is that they could, had it not been tor the collapse of .American · 
support, have reached luanda and delivered qola to an anti-
Comunist leadership'. 
- the assumption that Soviet support will *ive her a position of 
influence and a strategic base ia veey uncertain; past experience 
has shown new~ independant countries to be veey anxious to develop 
their own policies without outside interference; 
- the reference to the detente process was alwa¥s faulty bec~ae the 
Soviet Union has never interpreted detente as meaning she vould not 
assist wars of liberation wherever th&7 occurred. 
31. Irrespective however of past or fUture developments in 
qola the most relevant point is the Ya7 that this episode. was inter-
preted to further undel'm1De detente and to prove the ultimate unrelia-
bility of the Soviet Union. One positive feature was the refUsal of 
Congress to allow further Unitect States involvement, and the definite 
re3ection ot the concept that opposition to the Soviet Union wherever 
it became involved vas necessaril.J' a maJor security interest ot the 
United states. This was a clear re3ection of Dr. K1ssi111er's concept 
ot the indivisibility of detente, that is that Soviet involYement JllWit 
alvqs be Judged within the detente framework and most important frail 
the perspective of United States security interests. 
32. Events 1n qola have nov been overshadowed b7 developaents in 
other parts of Southern Africa, particularl.J' Rhodesia, and b7 
Dr. Kissinger's initiative. However, it the West is to act responsibl.J' 
tovarda achieving an equitable solution in Southern Africa tben the 
lessons of .Angola must not be lost. The prim817 lesson lllUit. be that 
aD¥ settlement must be based on national aspirations and realities 1 and 
not on super-power notiODS ot stability and self-interest. Arq attempt 
b7 the West to hinder or obstl'\lct progress in the direction of national 
selt-cletel'm1Dation will undoubtedlJ' inJect the ideolosical East-West 
competition into the potenti~ explosive black·vhite conflict. 
33. Whatever the outC<IIle of Dr. Kissinger's initiative ve mu•t 
not be influenced b7 those who tor so long have ignored the contra-
dictions inherent 1n South African and Rhodesian society and who ncnl 
advocate change but UDder the te~s of reference of the white minorities. 
It is these people who in explaining aD¥ subsequent failures in the 
negotiations will talk of the "mocteration" of the present Rhodesian 
govei'DIIlent and stress the ~rreaponaibiUt7 and unreliabilit7 ot the 
nationalist leaders. Yet 1\ is these same people who have consistentl.J' 
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opposed all measures designed to influence both the Rhoclesian and South 
African sovermnents of the necessity of chaiJse. The¥ have therefore 
contributed aubstanti~ to the present unfortunate situation. 
34. It Dr. Kissiaser'a diplamaey is not successful then it must 
be said that it has ccae too late. We all hope tor a peaceful settle. 
ment ancl an orderl7 trausition to majority rule, lut ve muat reallse 
that in the eyes of black Atric&DB this has alreaq been del&.J'ed too 
loDS• In their 8J'GS our efforts at mediation iDevitablJ' lack creclibilit;r. 
This credibility cau ODl7 deteriorate further it it is seen that we are 
now purauiDs a settlement not frail a sense of moral obligation and a 
cCIIIDI.itment to human dipit;r, but out of self interest tor our own 
securit,-. A lack of faith on the part of the Africans in the West' a 
desire and ability to briDS about the radical transtar.mation that is , 
needed, rill obviously increase the potential tor Soviet influence. 
It is ironic that tboae vbo shout loudest about Oammuniat infiltration 
and Soviet encirclment are the very people whose policies facilitate 
the introduction of this illfluence by mald.DS Soviet support the moat 
attractive option tor nationalist leaders 
35. The creclibilit,- of our obJectives is not onl.7 at stake with 
resU'cl to Rhodesia but also, 1D our seneral attitude to South Africa. 
There is little roca in this report tor a detailed reference to the 
clanestic situation in South Africa. The Rapporteur will, therefore, 
restrict himself to the following comments. Despite sips that South 
Africa is morias &118¥ trcm the application of 'pett,- apartheid' · 
(minor measures of racial c11scr1m1nation such as separate park benches, 
elevators 1 theatres etc. ) there is no chanse in the fundamental concept 
o'!: apartheid. The South African Ooverament continues to pursue a 
policy of political and economic danination of the black majority b;r 
the white minority without the participation of the maJority in the 
decision-maltiDS process. The means of implement iDS that dcmination 
have ch&DSed trcm outript racism to the more sophisticated concept 
ot 'homelands • and promises to move to 'independent' black states, 
(the 'white areas' comprise approximately 851 ot the total laud area 
aud include all major towns and cities). The concept remains the 
same. Moreover there is no indication that the South African Goverament 
has moved &VB¥ trCD 1 ts determination to enforce apartheid through 
repusn&Dt ancl oppressive laws, such as the pass laws, baDDiDS laws • 
the terrorism act, discr1m1natoey labour laws etc. Atric&l! political 
leaders remain b&DDed 1 exiled and Jailed. · 
36. The Rapporteur wishes to draw partictllar attention to the 
question of Namibia. The blind stubborDDesa of the South African 
sovermnent in continuiDS ita illesal hold over Namibia, and ita total 
disregard tor UN rulings and recommendations could easily produce ;ret 
another serious 1Databilit7 with ominous international repercussions. 
What meaninstul actions can our soveraments take to demonstrate our 
total condemnation of South Africa and her policies! In the Rapporteur's 
view the complexity of .economic relations makes the ~position of 
econanic sanctiODB extremely difficult to implement. However, he does 
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believe that the Security Council's Resolution calliDS tor .an arms 
embargo could be considerab~ strengthened and made to wor~. The 
failure of member countries to implement ~ positive actio~a on these 
11Dea must undermine black African faith iD the seriOUSDeaa·
1 
of our 
intentions. 
. I 
37. 'l'hoae who stress the strategic and economic impo~ance of 
Southern Africa to the West should realise that it these are our sole 
criteria tor attempting to find a settlement then ve have little to 
contribute to a laatins solution. It our o~ purpose is to achieve 
the minimum chanse compatible with ensuriDg our security interests 
then ve will again find ourselves support iDS the wroas aide 1 and this 
time the stakes in te:rma of potential conflict are very high. 
38. There are those 1 ot course 1 vho will argue that the battle 
11Dea are alreaq drawn and that the very survival of the West and 
indeed the 'tree world' 1 depends on thwarting Soviet influence in 
Southern Africa. One might ask by what right South Africa With 87% 
ot its population rightless and voteless can claim to be part of this 
'tree world'. We cannot •win" or "lose" in South Africa in absolute 
terms because it "winnias" means aupportias the present system, or 
truatratias natural aspirations, then it will be a very short lived 
victory. We have a responsibility to try to influence develop!Lenta in 
this region, and this responsibility is based on our respect tor human 
dignity and our ccmmitment to greater econaDic and social Justice in 
the world. We must recognise that to claim tW..t the security of an 
Alliance founded to protect the principles of freedom and of equality 
is dependent on the maintenance ot a system baaed on outrageous suppres-
sion and a denial ot these values , is a total contradiction 1n terms. 
39. Events in Southern Africa are relevant to the present discuaaiona 
on detente because thq reflect maD¥ ot the miaperceptions and exagera-
tiona concernias the central East-West relationship. Furthermore 1 
as reactions to these events have too frequent~ been viewed fran the 
East-West perspective 1 they have tended to enforce the prevailing 
suspicions of the Soviet Union, regardias both the militar;y balance and 
ita spread of influence. 
40. In the Rapporteur's view in both these cases there has been 
considerable exaggeration and over-simplification, and the results are 
untimate~ detrimental to the Alliance. Even the moat cursory 
examination of these issues indicates that the simple interpretation 
ot the Soviet menace is exasgerated and misleading. Cert~ we should 
not be guilty ot ignorias Soviet actions, but neither should ve be 
guilty ot alarmism or ot exaggerating the realities of Soviet paver 
and by consequence of diminishing our own, or ot ignoring the very real 
limitations on Soviet ability to gain influence. SUch actions can o~ 
lead in one direction, a return to tension a.nd controntation. The 
Alliance does not need such developaent tor Justification, nor will its 
ultimate credibility be eDhanced by such action. 
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41. In the Rapporteur's view it is important that the Alliance 
learn to adjust to the changing circumstances without returning to Cold 
War rhetoric. Detente represents a vital period ot transition, a 
period vhich will inevitab~ be claDinated by coutiDUing suspicion on 
both aides, &Del equ~ a period where caDpetition will continue in 
m&D;y areas. However, this ccmpeti tion should not be a11owecl to sullllerge 
the areas ot co-operation and UDClerat&DCU.ng that have been developed, 
nor shoulcl it be alloYed to produce ezasgerated notions ot our own 
vulnerability, nor tin~ should it be allowed. to distort our attitudes 
and policies towards external developnents so that we ignore local 
realities and national aspirations. 
III. WET mROPEAN COHJNIST PARTIES 
42. The problem ot assessing the threat to Western security posed 
by Soviet Power is an issue that bas confronted the Alliance sinee its 
beginning. However, a more radical challenge is nov facing the 
Alliance through the growth 1D influence of several West European 
Com.Uilist Parties. The question of Coumunist power-sharing has becane 
not onl.7 a problem tor the tuture structure ot the Alliance, it could 
also become the source of a maJor difference within the Alliance, 
particular~ between the United states and Europe. 
43. It was wide~ teared that the Italian elections would provide 
the Alliance with its tirst maJor test on this issue as it was thought 
that the Italian Caumunist Party would win a sufficient percentage of 
votes to guarantee them actual participation in the government. In 
tact, their support did not increase sufficiently to displace the 
Christian Democrats as the leading party, but it was enough to guarantee 
them a powerful, though indirect, say in the governing of the country. 
Signor .6nclreat'Ci vas able to form a goveriJlllent onl.7 with the agreed 
abstention of the Canmunist Party and his policies will. of necessity 
be influenced by the priorities ot the Cmnnnn1st Party. 
44. However, in the Rapporteur's view the elections did not answer, 
but merely postponed the questions posed before the elections. The 
growing relevance of the Communist Party in the ey-es of the Italian 
electorate has been a reflection of its success in local goverument and 
its coutrut to the apparent irrelevance ot the Christian Democrat 
Party which had tailed to provide firm government. Its future success 
will depend on whether the present Christian Democrat goverument can 
succeed in providing the political and econanic reforms that Italy needs. 
45. However, the Rapporteur does not intend to a.nal;yse 1D 8.1J7 
detail the current political situation in Italy. Be will refer to 
receut events in Italy o~ in as much as thq are relevant to the two 
issues he considers most important • the growth and tuture role of 
Western European Ocmmunist Parties and their significance to the 
Alliance. 
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46. Opinion regardiua the growth and aipiticance ot )lest European 
Commnniat Parties is extremel.T mixed. Mall¥ observers regarcl these 
parties as the unfortunate but inevitable products of the failures and 
wealmeaaea ot our own 117stema, proclucts that cannot be auppioeased or 
isnored, but Dllla't be acOCIDIIIOdated or defused bT era41catiua the conclitiona 
that produced them. Other more extreme critics regard tbm simpl.T as 
ma.Diteatationa of the Internaticmal Cclmnmiat Movement, derived and 
sponsored from Moscow. fo these observers the veey tel'lll Ccmmmiat is 
an anathau. and the existence of a CCIIIDILJDi at Party a direct threat to 
democratic society • thus thq ahO\Ilcl be opposed wherever thq appear. 
Between these approaches there is a large ~ ot opinion which is both 
contused and uncertain. Amoua this sroup few would disaaree that the 
European C".Qnummiat Party' a are the products of their envt.roments, and 
.not simply agents of Soviet power. But there is ll'eat uncertainty as 
to the precise role and tunction· ot these parties • via-l-via Moscow 
and also regardiua their ultimate objectives. 
47. It is tor this reason that the Rapporteur wishes to examine 
the present position of the parties. In his view thq represent an 
evolutioD&l7 process which vill have a significant impact on East-West 
relations and thus on the w.iauce itself. Their emergence will mark 
a farther move avq trail the static and rigiclly defined zones of the 
Cold War • and rill necessitate a further reshaping of attitudes and 
views towards the structure and objec:tiws of the Alliance • .&··.There has 
alreacl7 been a marltecl blurriug of the linea of tension and conflict 
through the various paths of 'detente' ancl the emergence of European 
ColllllUiliat Parties vill almost certainly contribute subat&Dtial.ly to 
this process. Their actions and policies will either confirm or erode 
the present 'credibility' gap that exists between their proferred 
intentions and their presumed objectives. Their evolution will also 
certainl.T have a aisnificaut effect on concepts and attitudes that are 
the products of the harsh realities of the Cold War. It is, of cOUl'le, 
extremely difficult to cane to arq definitive jucJaements on the tuture 
role of the parties because all Caamun1at Parties in Western Europe 
operate traa the cCIIlf'ortable position ot beiua outside the immediate 
power structure. However, in this respect it is particul.ar]7 aigniticaut 
to examine the position ot the Italian Comnnnist Part:,r because it has 
caae close to assuming responsibility in the governiua of the· count17. 
The Italian Ccmn1nist Party 
48. During the election campaign the Italian Comnuniat Party (PCI) 
stressed ita moderation and ita adherence to the 'bourgeois' political 
treedCIIlS of tree associates, tree speech, and the alternation of 
political parties in power. Furthermore, it contiJlU8l.)7 stressed ita 
independence frail Moacaw and the right tor each party to seek its own 
path to socialism. 'Ihia position, however, did not suddenly appear. 
OVer. the past two decades the PCI has gracluall7 and increasiual7 ma.Di-
fested its indepenclence, particular~ regardiua domestic ancl inter-part7 
affairs. It has demonstrated this independence by its opposition to the 
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Soviet 'ex-camnunication' ot China, and its criticism ot Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia and the repression ot Eastern European 
countries. 
49. During the ~ecent conference ot European Communist Parties, 
Mr. BerlingUer stressed the importance ot independence and individuality. 
He said that the traditional farm ot international Ccmmunist meetings 
daninated by the Moscow party 'is now outdated and must be abandoned ••• 
the truth is that there is not, and cannot be, any leading party or 
leading state, this is not the meet iDS ot an international Carmunist 
bod¥ which does not, and could not, exist in any torm, on either the 
world or the European level' • 
50. Mr. Berlinguer also reattirmed his party's pledge to maintain 
Itaq' s membership in the Common Market and in NA'l'O "ve are tightiDS 
so that the Italian people vi thin the tramework ot the international 
alliances to Which our country belongs can autonanoualy decide, without 
any foreign interference, its own political leadership."' The view 
expressed by PCI otticials is that arq move towards taking Italy out ot 
NA'l'O would create instability in Europe. They have stated their desire 
to work towards doing awq vi th the system ot military alliances and 
blocs, but until this is accanplished they do not favour changes forced 
by unilateral action. This includes budgetary spending ud the presence 
ot theatre nuclear weapons. Tbus the PCI professes an acceptance ot 
NATO's defence policy and ot NATO bases. Mr. BerlingUer has even argued 
that vi th regard to tbe. Per a l.ndependence ot Moscow NA'l'O could be viewed 
as a 'useful shie~ • behind which the PCI could pursue the Italian 
road to socialism vithou.t tear ot Soviet intervention. "It is also tar 
this reason that I want Italy not to leave the Atlantic Pact, and not 
~because our departure would upset the international balance, I 
feel more secure being on this side •••••• " 
The Pan &Jropean Conference 
51. The PCI is not alone in its bid to establish a new and more 
flexible relationship with the Soviet Union. Several other European 
Ccmmunist Parties ( inclUdiDS those ot Spain and France) favour a more 
independent line. Moscow's efforts to reassert Soviet authority through 
international conferences have tended, in tact to streDgthen these 
independent tendencies by almost institutionalising the right to disse~ 
52. The Pan :&Uropean Conference ot Colllllullist Parties, held in East 
Berlin on June 29th-30th, vas almost two years behind schedule. The 
dele¥ had been caused by a prolonged struggle betwean the conservative 
and independent parties over the character and content ot the collective 
document that was to be the agreed end product ot the conference. Most 
observers agree that the result vas a victory tor the "alliance" ot 
independent parties. The conservative maJori't7 headed by the CPSU and 
mainly canposed ot parties ot Warsaw Pact countries, tailed to impose a 
"general line" and had to yield to the demands ot the "independent" 
CCIDmunists, even to the extent ot asreeing that the final document was 
based on the new principle ot concensus. and that it was not binding on 
arq party. 
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53. The final document was as important tor Ybat it omitted as 
tor what it contained; there was no reference to international pro-
letarianism, no mention ot a leading centre, no condemnation ot China. 
The declaration spoke of "equalit," and sovereign independence ot 
each party, non-interference in international affairs and respect tor 
their tree choice ot different roads tor social change and socialism", 
it also recognis~~ that "dialogue and co-operation between Canmnn1st 
parties and other democratic and peace-loving forces is necessar,y •••• 
Cam!Nnist parties do not consider all those who are not in aareement 
with their policies as being anti-CCIIIIINDist •••• even broader Catholic 
forces, members ot other Christian ccmmunities and adherents ot other 
faiths pla7 an important role in the struggle tor the rights ot the 
working people and tor democraq and peace." 
54. Most observers agree that the East Berlin Conference marked a 
decisive phase in the history of the Communist movement and a definite 
diminution of Moscow's role and authority. Hovever,· despite these 
develop!lents II18DT critics remain unconvinced ot &121' substautial chana•· 
They see the Conference and the speeches nt the several leaders who 
emphasised their right to an independent approach as a tactical move 
designed to enable the parties to gain electoral support. For other 
observers, dependence or independence ot Moscow cloea not alter their 
basic objection to Ccmmunist parties which is based on the tact that 
CODIIDI1Dism, whatever its tozm, is sallething inherent~ evil which must 
be opposed wherever it emerges. Alliance officials point to mre 
practical objections regardina the consequences and implications of 
Cammmis:t participation in an Alliance country: 
- on a philosophical basis can an Alliance that was founded to 
counter the threat of cammmist aggression accommodate a government 
that includes CoJIIIlUDis.tst 
United States officials stress that this development YQlld be 
difficult tor Plblic opinion in the United States to accept, and 
could therefore lead to pressure tor a reduction in the United 
States c<XDIDi tment ;. 
- a Canmunist part,- would inevitably seek to reduce defence expend-
iture in order to shitt resources to other social priorities; 
such a reduction would impact on to the general equilibrium ot 
power between East-West; 
- a Communist Part7' s attitude to foreign policy would be different, 
and in time of crisis a Caamunist Party would inevitably lean 
towards Moscow; 
- to what extent can the European parties be independent ot Moscow 
and does such independence guarantee the maintenance ot such a 
stance once in powerl 
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- to what extent will the participe.tiou of ou pvb7 auch aa t• -PCI 
produce a 1 dCDino 1 reaction, in vhich other Zca:-opeezt OCIUD'tri.es 
would move 1D the same direction; 
- although C<Jmmmist parties have aareed to vork within and maintain 
the democratic pluralistic Q'stem can the;y be relied upon to keep 
their vordt 
- once in power would the Ccmmunists ever leave! What would prevent 
the sort ot take-overs seen in Europe just after the second World 
Wart 
- hov could BAm fwlction in the knowledge that Communists would 
have access to militaey iDtol'DI&tion of a sensitive nature? 
55. A rather wider implication that is trequentlJ' overlooked is 
the effect that Communist participation in Western Europe would have 
on the countries of Eastern Europe. It has been suggested that an 
independent Italian Comunist Part7 participating uDder pluralist 
coDditions vould create the demand in Eastern Europe tor greater autonaD7 
and possiblJ' reform. 'l'he ultimate ettect of such demands· on the 
developaent of East-West relations is dittic:ult to foresee but certai.Dl7 
merits closer examination and discussion. 
56. 'l'he Rapporteur disasrees with several of these basic objections. 
With regard to contraveDing the philosophical basis,ithe Alliance has a1reaa, 
accCIIIID.Odated govermnents in vhich Camnnnists have participated, e.g. 
Iceland and Portugal. Each specific case will have to be judged on ita 
merit and the Alliance reaction will clearlJ' depend on the DUIIlbers of 
Oommunist Ministers and the positions they hold. In the case of the 
plattol"'ll of the PCI with its emphasis on pluralism and democratic 
treedaDS, it v.ouJ.d not in the Rapporteur 1 s opinion, contradict the 
philosophical basis of the Alliance. 
- On the question of the allocation of resources , the Rapporteur does 
not believe that this vould be 8ZJ7 more of a problem than in the Borth 
:&lropean countries currentq governed b7 Social Democrats. Moreover, 
he would point out that it is preciselJ' because insufficient resources have 
been devoted to curing · social and econanic problems that the Ccmmunist 
movement has been able to gain electoral support in South European 
countries. 'l'hus the argument concerning priorit7 of allocation is self-
defeating. 'l'he more sociall1' satisfied a aociet7 the less its population 
will subscribe to doctrinaire Communism. 
- 'l'he anal.CQ with the take-overs in Eastern Europe atter World War II 
is hardl1' appropriate. The7 were affected asainst a background of 
circumstances which bear no relation to the Europe ot 1976 and moreover 
were affected through the m1lit8.17 presence of the Red A1:'sq • 
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- P1na117, on the question ot m1lita17 secrets there are very tew 
"11A1'0 secrets" and 1D the Rapportear' s view the problem coul4 be dealt 
with relative]¥ easfl7. 
51. ID most discussiODS on tbe 1mpl.ications ot CcDmunist partici-
pation the example ot Ombal s actiODS 1D Portusal are trequentl7 quoted 
as an example ot wb¥ Comnnmiats cBDDot be trusted. However, it shoald 
be remembered that the Portuguese CP 8Dd CUDhal 1D particular was a 
unique case amoug Earopean CP's 1D its attitude to the Soviet Union. 
Cunhal. • s experience UDder 9al.azar ad caetauo and also his leugtb,- stq 
1D Moscow had given him a 'VerT particular perspective OD Portuguese 
society, a deep cUslike tor BAm because ot its tailure to act agaiDst 
Caetao and a sense ot gratitude ad obligation to Moscow. It should 
also be remembered that he was cleteated by pop1lar reaction and because 
his rea.ponse was not a national.l7 inspi:red one. 
58. ID the Bapportear' s viev the cODSequence tor the Alliance will 
not come trom the direct ettects ot the participation by cmmnn1 sts 
in member goV'el'IJIIlell bllt rather trom our own inability to ad.1ust and 
acc(l'!!!!()odate to this new developneut. It is 1mportaDt to realise that 
Western Communist Parties are social realities that no amowrt ot 
ca.,1ol1Dg or threatening v:Ul remove trom sight. The position ot the 
United States .Adm1.Distration to the election process 1D I~ was wroag 
because it appearecl to evDla trcm the bellet that all political 
behaviour is automatical.l7 geared to the East-West context • and that 
the Itall&D situation coal.d be made to contemn to the demaDds ot 
international stabUity. 
59. Bather than cont1Duousl7 contemplating worst-case 1mpl.ications 
and repercussions the All1aace should react to the growiag intluence 
ot CommuDist Parties 1D a pragmatic ancl measured taahion. Camnnn1 at 
participation 1D &1\Y' member cOUD'tr7 shoald be seen tor what it is • a 
national :reBpoDBe to national problema 8DCl preoccupations. It shoul.cl 
not be represented as a tatal anti-'boq 1D the democratic framework 
ot the .AJ.11ace. It should be remembered that this tramework survived 
the membership ot Portugal UDder Caet&Do and Greece UDcler the Colonels 
neither ot w!d.ch regime showed much l'k:Jng tor the priDciples ot 
democrac,-. 
6o. Bo one, ot course, caD be sure that it or when the Comnnmists 
participate 1D gcweruue:rt; the7 will keep their pJtem:J.ses. However • it 
we caDDOt predict fUture developu.ents ve can at least retrain trom 
negative actions such as dramatic threats 8Dd warnings baaed on 
'worst-case' pro3ections. SUch torecaats serve onl.7 as selt-tulf'illlng 
prophecies as they contribate to the 'Ve%'7 process they are attempting 
to prevent. Perhaps 1D our reactions to these developments ve are 
still concUtioned too much by semantics BDcl b;y our past ezperi•ces. 
Thus our assessments ot the present situation are based on concepts 
that are 110 loDger valid. In this respect it is 1Dstructive to recollect 
that tor a considerable period lll&DT observers 1D the United States 
taUed to clistiDgaish between Comrrrnntsta ancl Socialists, aDd that tor 
several years we did Dot perceive the very real split between Soviet 
and Chinese Canna•nfsm. 
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61. It is possible • therefore, tbat the growth of 'West Barope8D 
COJI!DIImist Parties does mark a aev phase in East-West nlatiaas that 
calla tor a treah response and fresh assesameut on our part. Tbe 
appearance of these parties mq not be desirable but it is import&Dt 
to recognise that they are created by the conditions in our own 
societies and not by outside influences. Dire waminss ot international 
repercussions have no relevance because situations like these are DCt 
responsive to the demands of iuternational stabUity. SUch a reaction 
merely ignores national realities and is ultimately counter productive. 
The challenge these parties pose JllUSt be faced. The Alli8Dce must sbov 
itself capable of adaptina to them because there is no alternative." Whether 
Euro-communism is a passing »henomenon or a developmeut ot greater 
pe1'1118Dence it demaDds a flexible 8Dd prapatic response. 'l'he Alliance 
has, in the past s~own itself capable of real flexibility and in the 
Rapporteur's view it has the capacity to do so again. 
IV. SPAili 
62. Since the interim report in Mq there have been sipiticant 
developments in Spain that in the Rapporteur's view necessitate a 
more detailed analysis of the curreut situation. 
63. The govel'DIIlent of Mr. Arias Navarzo has been replaced by that 
of 1&-. Suarez who. has alread7 adopted several measures which. would 
appear to 110ve the country towards a more democratic 8Dd liberal 
society. However, while velcomina these developments the Rapporteur notes 
with considerable apprehension the formidable obstacles which remain to 
be overcome before tul~ democratic conditions C8D be inst&Ued in Spain. 
611. The pnent situation contains inherent contradictions which 
must inevitably quality 11D7 optimistic forecast tor Spain's fUture. 
The essential paradox is that the govermaent is attempting to tind a 
path to democracy within the existins aDti-c1.emccratic framework when the 
very chaDges that it seeks can only be achieved through the elimination 
ot this framework. 
65. The institutional and administrative trame.vork erected by 
Franco and his 'basic lawllt remain in torce. The power1Ul military 8Dd 
econOmic interests of the old suarc1 (the tBuDlter) still retain considerable 
pover and they have so tar shown themselves unwilling to eutertain the 
concept of liberalising reforms, and certainly not the degree of reform 
sougbt by the popular forces. The government is attemptina to introduce 
measures gradually in a fashion that will not provoke this still powertul 
opposition, but will move the country closer to democracy ancl satisfy 
popular demands. Tbe King and his government are faced with the almost 
impossible task of trying to move fast enough to satisfy popular clemand 
while not moving too qui~ md alienatina the Bunltar. Thus the tull 
powers of the repretsive Fr8Dco regime remain to intimidate and restrict 
and it is difficult to envisage real progress until these have been removed. 
66. Three groupings have emerged during this tranai tional period -
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(i) the Bunker, the militar,y, economic ancl admi.nistrati"Ve 
institutions established by Franco to perpetuate hi' role; 
as this includes the CouncU ot the Realm, Jll8.D1' members ot the 
Cortes, seniot" officers in the armed forces and pollee, and 
key figures in the world ot finance, it still wiela. considerabl~ 
power and stands as a permanent bulwark to reform. 
{ ii) the King, end his government, supported by a certain section 
ot reform~minded technocrats who accumrml.ated influence and 
position during Franco's time under his polici~; t~ are .. 
now aware ot the stultifYina effect ot his legaey, 4nxious 
that Spain should mve towards Europe,. and aware ot the basic 
requirements ot such a move, willing to implement liberal retol'IU 
but through the control ot the constitutional legitimacy ot 
the King; the Kina himself is faced with the problem ot 
establishing a democratic legitimacy tor his throne based on the 
sovereignty of the people, as Qpposed to the personal prerosatlYtp 
ot General Franco. 
(iii) finally, the popular forces as represented by. the :~~laDY political 
parties, associations and trade unions; after years of harsh 
suppression the Opposition is inevitably tactionalised on a 
regional, functional and ideological basis, but they are 
united in the common desire to achieve real and meaningtul 
reforms that will guarantee true democraey, and they are impatient 
tor change. · 
67. In July Mr. Arias Navarro resigned as PriMe Minister reportedly 
over disasreements with the King over the slowness of his reform measures. 
The choice of Hr. Adolfo Suarez as his successor was something of a surprie 
as he had been Minister responsible tor the Falangist movement in the Arias 
government and President of the right wing Democratic Union. However, under 
his leadership several liberalising measures have been promulgated, includiDDJ 
a general amnesty end a draft electoral pr-J gramme, and a general 
atmosphere of tolerance has ensued. Although appreciating and welcoming 
these measures the Rapporteur must comment that in each case they are . 
limited in application. l:-bst specifically he notes that the air ot tolerance 
bas been engendered by changes in attitude rather than substance, the basic · 
laws of the old Franco regime remain in existence as a permanent obstacle 
to the ettecti veness of any liberalising measures. 
The Amnestl 
68. A general amnesty was announced by the King on 3oth July. 
It was applied to all political prisoners or exiles r'who had not end.allpred 
or committed attacks against life or the integrity of the humaD being". 
Although a considerable number of people have been released there bas been 
some criticism of the slowness of application caused by the militar,y courts 
which pronounced judgement being required to reconsider each case 
individually. The government is also still restrictive in its policy 
towards . pe~ttins ·'lbe ~urn ot exiles. 
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The Freedom 
69. There has been substantial movement on the part ot tbe King 
and his sovemment to provide Spain with what Jll&DY people regard as 
the classic principles ot democracy, freedom ot association, assembJ.1' and 
expression, and a parliament freely elected by universal suffrage. 
However, tor the moment these goals remain in the realm of pl'OIIIise and 
expectation rather than substance. In all cases, the mowment towuds 
relaxation and reform has been restricted by the rigid framework within 
which it is forced to operate. 
TO. It is certainly true that there is a general. air of relaxation 
in Spain but this mood is based on tolerance rather than established 
rights. The govel'IUIIent is tolerating 1118117 activities that were illegal 
under the old regime, but has done nothing to alter the laws or dismantle 
the old structure. 
Tl. Expression - freedom ot expression has been introduced in 
the sense that a critical press now exists and books are treel.1' available. 
But the censorship laws are still in force and the Minister retains the 
power ot ultimate control. It has been reported that the press is sill. 
subject to considerable pressures. The govei'DJIIent has maintainecl tull control 
over the television and radio. 
T2. Assembl.y - under the law ot Mq 25th, meetings of more than 25 
are permitted, no authorisation is needed tor indoor meetings but applications 
are required tor outdoor assemblies. 
T3. Association political parties JJ~q be authorised it they 
accept preliminary examination and a process ot registration, a process 
which rejects any party that "is subjected to international discipline 
and aims to establish a totalitarian regime~: and vbich refuses to obey the 
basic laws still remaining trom Franco's regime. These considerations 
a....-e clearly aimed at the Communist Party vhich thus remains illegal and 
excluded f'rom participation in the constitutional future ot the country 
The Communist Party is said to represent around 10% ot the population, but 
atter years of suppression its popular support is difficult to assess. 
However, whatever its support its exclusion is a clear violation of a 
fundamental democratic principle. 
trade unions are becoming organised but are still not 
technically recoSDised. The government's Programme Declaration stated 
that it :;intends to speed up reform ot labour laws, and recognise Trade 
Union treedoms1'. However, a parliamentary BUl which will be submitted 
to the Cortes stipulated that unions must shov themselves independent 
from political parties, must apply' tor government recognition. and set 
limits on trade union freedoms which the unions regard as unacceptable. 
Like the political parties the trade unions 8Djoy much greater freedom to 
organise and hold meetings but they need fUll recognition through nev lava. 
T4. The Draft Law on Political Reform - in promulgating the Draft 
Law the Prime Minister proclaimed that soTereignty rested with the people 
and that democracy in Spain wuld be based on the . supremacy of law. 
Legislative powers will rest with the Cortes consisting of a Lower Bouse 
elected by secret and universal suffrage and a Senate, with members elected 
on a regional basis. This process will be put to the people in a reterend\Dil 
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but must first pass the present Cortes b7 a two-thirds majoritr. 
alread1' the Ruling Council ot the National Movement (the-o~ 
political partr sl.lowed under Franco) bas voted to modify and dilute the 
government' a proposals tor direct elections to both houses. 
the passage ot the Bill through the Cortes (it will be 
presented in the very near fUture) vill be extremely di.tticult. 
the Bill itself has been criticised tor its ambiguitr in 
several ker areas, e.g, 'What will the relationship be between goverament 
and parliament, will the referendum jeopardise the sovereign powers ot 
the elected parliament! 
75. The Opposition - there are . believed to be between 200 and 300 
opposition groups ranging tram moderate right to extreme lett. The 
retention ot the Francoist institutions and practices bas led to this 
wide spectrum ot grouping vi thholding their support trom the government 1 a 
proposals. Ther have rejected the draft law on the grounds that the people 
cazmot exercise their sovereigntr until grant9d all freedoms currently 
denied by' the present order. The proposed qstem will be credible onl.1 
when all parties can express themselves freelr. The opposition parties 
wish, therefore, to participate in the process ot poJ?U].ar consultation, ther 
object to having their fUture structure haDcled down vithout any popular 
participation. Ther have therefore demanded immediate freedoms tor all. 
parties, including the Commnnj sts, the formation of a broacll1 based provisional 
government, and prol!'Pt elections tor an Assembl.y to 1orrite a new Constitution. 
The EconOJ!lY 
76. The difticulties facing Spain during this vital transitional 
period will uncloubtedl1 be compounded bf tlie economic problems abe is 
currentlf encountering. AD'¥ govel'IDII8nt vill have to cope with severe 
problems and will need help and coopeation from all sectors ot the working 
public. 
j7. Finally, the government 1 s task is complicated by' separatists' 
demands :tor regional autono~ aDd the spasmodic outbursts ot violence. 
These tend to strengthen the position ot the extreme right, particularly 
the army and police, in their demand tor· stricter measures to improve lav 
and order. 
Summary 
78. Many observers take the vie1J thet Spain has now begun a slow 
but irreversible march dow the road to damocracy. OtherfJ, however, 
teel· that such optimism is not justified by the present situation and 
that the still powerful forces of reaction will inhibit and restrict progress 
to true democracy. Certainlr the inte:rnal. contradictions between the 
aovermn.ent and the existing framework are all too evident in the uncertain 
course that the government is pursuing, a curious balance ot freedoms 
granted and freedoms withheld. The most esseuti.al. problem tor 1;he government 
is to avoid the polarisation ot Spanish societr. It is attempting to 
prevent this with measures aimed at satisfying two sets ot irreconcilable 
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19. The government remains the prisoner of Franco's legaey and 
ot the irrational tears of the vested interests who see chaos and anarch¥ in 
eveey reform. Unfort\Dlatel.1', it it continues to placate the Bunker it will 
inevitably lose whatever credibilit7 it has built up with the Opposition. 
Thus it must soon make a choice between diamantli.Dg the old structure so 
that freedoms can be legally and permanently established and genuine 
participation achieved, or maintaining the present balancing act, in which 
case whatever progress is achieved will probabl.1' be too little and too late. 
V. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATIO!l 
Introduction (~) 
8o. In his introduction the Rapporteur referred to the nev pressures 
and problems that were beginning to affect the member countries of the 
Alliance.- problems that were not responsive to formulae and solutions 
devised during the past decade and which in their long term sis;Diticance 
transcend the lines of· competition between East and West. In his view the 
problem of the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons is such a problem. 
81. In its latest publication SIPRI states that within the next 
nine )Pears as a bf-product of peaceful nuclear proliferation 35 countries 
will possess the capabilitr to make nuclear weapons. This statement represents 
the crux of the ''proliferation problem•:. As the developnent of nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes has become an increasinglJ attractive option so 
the number of nuclear reactors has multiplied, particularl1' among the 
developing countries. 
82. The rapid advance of technolog and its widespread dissemination 
has meant that the problem of moving from nuclear power tor peaceful 
purposes to the developnent of nuclear weapons has decreased substantially. 
Essentially a technical problem during the past 15 rears the issue of 
proliferation has now moved into the political forum. 
83. Since World War II ti ve powers have deployed nuclear capable 
milit8.1'7 forces, another state has detonated a single nuclear device, and at 
least one other state is thought to have several nuclear weapons in a secret 
reserve. The question that no-one can predict is bow lODS will it be before 
another countey turns its nuclear programme to the production of a nuclear 
weapon. The question that faces all responsible politicians is what framework 
can be erected and what procedures devised that will control the prolifer .:tioO. 
ot nuclear power and thus avoid the nightmare of a world tull of states 
equipped with nuclear weapons. 
84. Concern over this d :.ation has manifested itself in several 
areas. The Bon-Proliferation 'l'reat7 has been sis;Ded b7 115 states and 
ratified b7 100, although there are some notable near-nuclear absentees 
including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and South 
Africa. Considerable concern has been demonstrated recentl1' in the United 
States and both President Ford and Mr. Carter have made the problem of nuclear 
proliferation· a sulisl;antial. part of their pre-election programmes. 
International. concern baa also been shown b7 the formation of a suppliers • 
club aimed at establishing guidelines tor future exports of nuclear technolog. 
85. Despite this political. concern it would appear that econaaic and 
commercial interests continue to reiSD supreme. This dominance vas demons~rated 
recently b7 the sales of France and West Gel'III&D1 of nuclear ./ ••• 
~ For a discussion of the technical. and economic aspects or proliferation 
members are referred to the Draft Report on Buclear Energ (Tl49 STC (76) 11). 
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facilities, including nuclear processing pl&Dts, to Pakistan and Brazil 
respecti vel7. Although both the latter countries have agreed to 
inspection aDd supervision by the IAEA (*) the deals have.·&I'OUHd conai4e:rable 
international. criticism. The :reason tor this criticism is that it is not 
felt that such agreements provide sufficient constrain1B to prevent a cOUDt1'7 
t:rom r:going nuclear" in the long term. 
86. Can proliferation be contJ'Olledf The question immediately· 
provokes several others - why should we want to control proliferation, 
do we have the right to impose :restraints and limitations on the freedom 
of action ot developing nations, what meaus do ve have at our clisposal, 
cau political control overcome ec:momic and commercial. factors, vbat is 
the impact ot proliferation on our security interests, would proliferation 
make tor a less or a more stable world, and finally what are the Nalistic 
chances ot establishing a fo:rmula that satisfies both the b~rs and the 
sellers ot nuclear technology! The list could be extended but these indicate 
the caa.plexi.ty ot the issue. 
81. Running throughout these issues are tw central themes : 
firstly the relationship ot the ;;developed~' to the :;developing;; world and 
our desire to ensure a more equitable distribution of the earth's :resources, 
aud secondly the implications ot proliferation tor the securit;r ot the world, 
particularly trom the perspective of the East-West :relationship. 
WhY should we prevent proliferation? 
8'8. Some experts argue that in areas ot regi.on&l tension possession 
of nuclear weapons could actually ha'9e a stabilising effect in that tbey would 
inhibit rather thau encourage the use ot force. Tbe;r voul.d make the desire 
to:r total victo:ey :risky and thus impose more limited aims on potential 
contestauts. For the Rapporteur, however, such a contention is outweighed 
by the JI18DY' uncertainties aud imponderables involved in the widespread 
possession ot nuclear weapons. 
8'9. In his view the greater the diversification ot the possession 
ot nuclear weapons the greater the chance ot nuclear war whether by' cbaDce 
or design. The acquisition ot a nuclear device by one state would certa.inl7 
be followed by similar actions by its neighbours. Regional. proliferation ot 
this nature has the implied risk that these weepcms would at sane staae be 
controlled by' irresponsible o:r unreliable leacle:rship not subject to the usual 
restraints of international behaviour. 
90. Acquisition by developing nations could have the efteat; ot "aking 
nations who have &l:reacly renounced their claim to nuclear reapons aud signed 
the NPT reconsider their decision. 
91· Proliferation on this scale would clearly have an adverse affect 
on the super-power relationship because it would increase the uncertaint7 
of this relationship. It cOl:ld also have a negative effect on arms control, 
tor example, one could foresee defence experts making a ve:ey convincing 
argument tor the return of ABM sites. 
9.2. Finally, ~ such proliferation must make the scenario of the 
seizure of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist g&Dg more likely. 
* International Atomic Eneru Author1t7 
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Have we the ri8ht! 
93. There are clearly' an overwhelming number of arguments wey ve 
should tr;y to coutrol the export of nuclear tecbnolog but have ve the 
right! From our own Eurocentric or ;'inclustri&l.ised world" perspective 
the position is ver;y clear, we and the world, would be much safer if nuclear 
teclmologr was under strict coutrol. But trom the perspective of the 
"developing11 nations the situation is somewhat different. 
~ • Our efforts to impose procedures and formulae are seen as 
yet another example of the 'haves'' dictatins terms to the ':have nots·i. 
Tbese terms are seen to beneti t the 11haves" and to restrict the freedom 
ot choice of the •;have nota :I, and are thus regarded as discriminator;y. 
95 • There is &l.so a growing feeling of resentment at the implied 
messase in the preseut formulae being offered, that these countries lack 
the essential. experience, experti&3 and responsibilit;y to be trusted with 
this teclmology. 
96. Finall7, developing countries see the value of nuclear weapons 
as symbols of power and prestige, the ke;y to a voice in intemation&l. affairs, 
and in the absence ot any other criteria this 1118¥ be their tol'lllUla.. tor hav.ins 
their voices heard. The;y can also poiut to the total failure of the super-
powers to make 81.17 me&Dingtul move to restrain or reduce their own stratesic 
arms arsenals. It should be remembered that Article IV requires "Each 
of the Parties to the Treaty ••• to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
ettecti ve measures relatiq to cessation of the nucle.ar arms race at an 
early' date and to nuclear dis&l'Jll8'1lent ~~ Since the Treat;y the nuclear 
weapons ttoctpiles of each of the superpowers have greatly increased both in 
numbers and diversity. 
91. The resentment and suspicion of the developing nations aces not 
mean that our efforts at proliferation will not work but it does mean 
that we should make ever;y endeavour to involve them in the establishment 
ot a non-proliferation framework. It must be demonstrated that proliferation 
is not only a problem tor the :'haves'' and that the industrialised world is 
acting in the general. interest. Procedures must be found to involve the 
developing nations in the management of the system, it should not remain a 
seller's monopoly'. 
What has been achieved? 
Eccaomi.c Background 
98. Two ingredients are necessary tor the production of a bomb 
weapon gracle material and teclmological expertise; present trends make 
neither an insuperable problem. The question bas ceased to be ;:whether" 
a couutr;y has the capability to make a bomb but bow to 'aissuadd' or 'prevent" 
it from doing so. 
99. On a technical level the solution lies in dissuading states 
from acquiring nuclear fuel cycle facilities that use or produ'=e weapons 
grade material. Several methods have been suggested -
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increasing supplies of uranium, regional multi-national tuel 07cle facilities, 
spent tuel and plutoni\Dil repositories, and to create a bWer' s market tor 
enrichment and reprocessing services. 
100. However, such dissuasion is difficult to implement because ·it is 
here that commercial factors appear to override political. In aD¥ 
commercial environment the prospective seller has to make the most adviDtqeous 
otter and this ~not alwqs be commensurate with the interests ot non-
proliferation. Furthermore there ~ be Jll&DY' reasons, both political and 
economic why' a buyer~ want to have his ow facilities. 
101. Thus where sales ot these facilities take place the maximum 
that can be asked is that the supplier state insists on the most rigorous 
set of conditions. Ideally this would involve ratification of the 
NPr or placing all nuclear facilities under safeguards. 
102. However, it must be remembered that whatever the degree of 
control agreed to these agreements are only as good as the faith ot the 
contracting parties and the efficiency of those NJP)nsible tor their 
enforcement. The tact is that no-one can really prevent a state troiJ1 obtaining 
a nuclear capability it it so wishes. Thus, despite the necessity ot 
diminishing the opportunity through a strict sales policy and rigid safeguards 
the problem ot preventing proliferation is essentially political in nature. 
Political Barkground 
103. Ita the technical barriers to the acquisition ot nuclear . 
weapons have declined it has increasinsl.Y become a political problem .• 
Essentially political factors must become dominant over economic and 
commercial interests. 
104. . One over-riding necessity is to reduce the prestige and QJDbolic 
importance of nuclear weapons in world poUtics. This can only be done by 
the super-powers and until they make meaninstul arms control asreements 
that actually restrain the present vertical proliferation of their ovn systems 
it will remain difficult for them to preach the necessity of non-
proliferation. 
105. Non-nuclear states will normal.l.7 be led to acquire nuclear 
weapons as they auticipate receiving political and security benefits trom 
possessing them. As the most likely candidates will be states that are 
confronted by maJor challenges to their borders this poses same difficult 
dilemmas. 'l'o what extent will the major powers be prepared to otter 
disincentives in the wq ot security guarantees, weapons etc. To vhat 
extent is the flow ot United states arms to Israel to remove the necesai ty 
ot the developnent of a nuclear "deterrent :t, what guarantee would we 
be vill.ing to otter South Atrica to dissuade her from developing a nucle8Z' 
weapon as the ultimate answer to her threatening black neighbours! 
lo6. The political dimension of non-proliferation is thus 
highly complex. Political awareness and interest is beginning to show 
itself. The terms and status of the NPl' are well know as are ita limi.tatiQ:ls. 
Despite ita lack o:t effectiveness it is important to realise that ita 
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existence does provid.e a framework within which to work and a set of 
objectiTes. As such it is important and should be continual.l.1 strengthened. 
lOT. It has been reported that the suppliers club (the original 
seven, the United States, USSR, France, Federal Republic of 0el"JUD7, 
United Kinpm, Canada and Japan have been joined b7 BeJ.sium, CSSR, 
0ei'ID8D Democxat ic Republic, Ita.'L7, the Netherlancls, Poland and SVc.clen) 
reached agreement tor the aategu8Z'cling of exports of the three moat sensitiTe 
technologies. It should also be noted that following the severe 
criticism of its deal with Paldatan the French aovernment is showing signs 
of flexibility md responsiwness to this international concern. It has 
been reported that President Giscarcl has established a high r&Dking nuclear 
review committee md that French officials are ready to discuss future 
nuclear export restraints. 
lOS. The United States has been pushing tor a much tougher line, 
pressing tor a ball on exports of nuclear tuel reprocessing plants. 
The United States wants to ensure that nuclear tuel tor power is enriched 
or reprocessed in international installations under IAEA and open to all 
on equal tems. Hence the friction generated b7 the French mel Gezmau 
sale1. If' the United States does decicl8 to adopt a touaher line this could 
lead. to serious disagreement and friction within the .Allimce. 
Conclusions 
109. Despite the complexity of the subject there are many areas 
of improvement to be pursued. Fundamentally' it is important to overcome 
the cliscri.dnatory aspects of' the implementation of' non-proliferation, 
that is between those countries possessing a nuclear capability md those 
that do not. 
110. Although the NPr is far from perfect it does provide a political 
framework md a set of objectives; thus every effort should be made to 
improve its membership and its provis.i.ons. The mat ideal solution would be 
to press tor a ban on the export of all nuclear technology to non parties to 
the m, but politically and commercially this is not possible. However, the 
status of' the Treaty could be enhanced by : 
- the nuclear weapon parties making a mre determined effort to 
carry out their obligations undertaken at the ti.ue of the signing of the 
Treaty - a genuine SALT agreement YOUld demonstrate the seriousness of' the 
super-powers' intentions. 
all countries should be ercOuraged to Join and ratitr the Treaty 
every effort should be made to reduce the sale of' sensitive fUel 
facilities and a system developed involTing multi-national participation 
in, and international supervision of, the critical elements of the fUel 
cycle, thus giving an assurance that nations can obtain the materials 
and facilities necessary for their power programmes. 
where dales of these critical facilities take place maximum 
restraints should be demanded from the buyer, i.e. agreement to accept 
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full IAEA safeguards on all their peacetul nucle&l' programmes 
on the particular materials concemed). 
I 
(not onJ.¥ 
international and national safeguards s;ystems should be 
strengthened and made universal, particularly regarding pby'sical. 
securit;y ae;ainst theft or sabotage b;y private groups or individuals. I i 
I 
I 
111. Above all, it should be recognised that whatever terms an~ 
controls are ae;reed the non-acquisition of a nuclear weapon capabilitt 
is a question of good faith. Therefore all parties, buyers and sellei's, 
should be involved in the acquisition and management of a s;ystem of / 
international control. : 
i 
112. As prOliferation is in the final analysis a political problem 
the dominance of political values over commercial ones must be asserted 
and the objective of non-proliferation accepted throughout national polic;y. 
